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Designing for the Best Composition of International Courts:  
The Value of Diverse and Specialised International Law Expertise on the Bench 
 
Dr Adamantia Rachovitsa* 
Abstract  
The book chapter discusses the appropriate types of expertise that should be available in the 
composition of international courts. The main argument is that the international bench needs 
to include judges with diverse and specialised expertise. For this reason, the concept 
‘competence in international law’ as a statutory requirement for nomination and election of 
judges, can be construed broadly seeking out individuals who not only have recognised 
competence in international law stricto sensu but also strong complementary knowledge in 
specialised area(s) of international law relevant to a given court’s judicial work. Judges who 
are conversant with both general and special aspects and areas of international law are well 
placed to navigate the complexity and density of international law entrenched in disputes 
submitted for international adjudication. The first part of the discussion engages with the idea 
that general international courts value expertise of judges in specialised areas of international 
law and that specialised international courts value judges with competence in international law. 
Existing statutory election requirements may accommodate this suggestion. The second part of 
the discussion explores the detailed expertise requirements incorporated in the statutes of 
certain, new international courts. Novel developments suggest a turn towards favouring and 
quantifying required expertise in different areas of international law when deciding the overall 
composition of a court.  
 
1. Introduction  
Despite growing legal scholarship on various aspects of judicial dispute settlement,1 the issue 
of the expertise of judges sitting on the international bench is under-studied. When nominating 
and electing judges, the appropriate level and type of expertise of the women and men serving 
on international courts is an individual election requirement. In contrast, decisions about the 
composition of a court involve the consideration of other criteria, such as the representation of 
the main forms of civilisation, principal legal systems and genders.2 An interesting 
                                               
* Assistant Professor of Public International Law, Faculty of Law, University of Groningen, 
(a.rachovitsa@rug.nl). A version of this book chapter was presented at the conference Comparative Procedure in 
State-to-State Disputes, organised by the Grotius Centre for International Legal Studies, Leiden University at The 
Hague (28-29 May 2019).  
1 See, e.g., P. Sands, ‘Global Governance and the International Judiciary: Choosing Our Judges’ (2003) 56 
Current Legal Problems 481, at 484; M. Bobek (ed.), Selecting Europe's Judges: A Critical Review of the 
Appointment Procedures to the European Courts (2015); F. Baetens (ed.), Legitimacy of Unseen Actors in 
International Adjudication (2019); R. Howse and others (eds.), The Legitimacy of International Trade Courts and 
Tribunals (2018). See also The Burgh House Principles on the Independence of the International Judiciary, 
adopted by the Study Group of the International Law Association on the Practice and Procedure of International 
Courts and Tribunals, in association with the Project on International Courts and Tribunals, 2004. 
2 See, e.g., 1946 Statute of the International Court of Justice (‘ICJ’), 33 UNTS 993, Art. 9; Statute of the 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (‘ITLOS’) (Annex VI of the 1982 United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea, 1833 UNTS 3), Art. 2(2); and 1998 Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 
OAU/LEG/EXP/AFCHPRIPROT(III), Art. 14(2). 
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development is that the competence of judges in (specific areas of) international law is 
becoming a key criterion and, in certain instances, states are willing to formalise specific 
expertise considerations by introducing statutory requirements when deciding the overall 
composition of a court. 
The main argument of this chapter is that international courts need to include in their 
composition judges with diverse and specialised expertise. For this reason, the concept 
‘competence in international law’ as a statutory requirement for election of judges, should be 
construed broadly. The chapter explains why and in what ways the overall composition of 
expertise on the bench can and should be shaped. It may not be realistic or desirable for all 
members of the bench to have specific expertise, but it is valid to specify criteria relating to 
expertise that needs to be present in the composition of a court.3 In this way, international 
courts are well equipped to fulfil their jurisdiction ratione materiae and to address adequately 
the increasing diversification of disputes brought before them.  
Following the Introduction, Section 2 of the chapter examines how existing statutory 
election requirements across international courts may accommodate the idea of electing judges 
with mixed and specialised expertise. The discussion starts with the distinction between general 
and specialised international courts and their respective judges’ expertise in (areas) of 
international law. I argue, somehow counterintuitively, that the composition of courts of 
general jurisdiction (e.g. the International Court of Justice) should also include judges who 
have a strong background in specialised areas of international law. The analysis gives examples 
of how this is incorporated in practice when electing judges and briefly explores the statutory 
tools available for developing specialised expertise.  
Conversely, the bench of specialised international courts should include not only judges 
with specialised expertise relevant to a court’s material jurisdiction but also judges with 
competence in international law. The discussion first explains why international law expertise 
is relevant on the bench of specialised courts and it then critically unpacks the meaning of 
competence in international law. I submit that we need to interpret competence in international 
law broadly by way of thinking beyond the orthodoxy of so-called ‘general’ international law 
and valuing the presence of diverse and mixed backgrounds. Specialised courts need judges 
                                               
3 Institut de Droit International, Sixth Commission, Resolution on The Position of the International Judge, 9 
September 2011 (Rapporteur: G. Guillaume; Membership: M. Bernhardt, Dame R. Higgins, M. Kirsch, Sir E. 
Lauterpacht, M. M. Makarczyk, M. Rangel, T. Meron, O. Vicuña, R. Ranjeva, G. Ress, S. M. Schwebel, C. 
Tomuschat, T. Treves and L. Wildhaber), deliberations in Annuaire de l’ Institut de Droit International, Séssion 
de Rhodes, volume 74, at 88‒89, available at www.idi-iil.org/en/sessions/rhodes-2011/?post_type=publication; 
R. Mackenzie et al., Selecting International Judges: Principle, Process, and Politics (2010), at 46‒47. 
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who have expert knowledge of general issues of international law and a strong background in 
the specialised area falling under the court’s jurisdiction. This mixed background is also 
indispensable for forging connections across different areas of international law. 
Section 3 of the chapter proceeds to examine how the idea of including judges with 
diverse and specialised expertise in the composition of an international court starts to gain 
traction. There is a trend towards designing novel and detailed expertise requirements when 
creating new international courts. On certain occasions, states set quantitative requirements for 
the presence of expertise in international law, and areas thereof, on the bench. As it will be 
discussed, the International Criminal Court, the future African Court of Justice and Human 
Rights and the Caribbean Court of Justice are prominent examples. The analysis finds that 
international law expertise is used by states as a ‘shorthand’ and, subject to the details of each 
statute, should be construed as being inclusive of different areas of international law. Caution 
is, however, advised when drafting the statute of a new international court: once cemented into 
a statutory requirement, detailed quantification schemes become difficult to amend in the future 
and are at risk of becoming redundant. The chapter concludes by bringing together the 
changing functions of international courts with states’ expectations of the courts’ role in 
international affairs.  
 
 
2. The distinction between general and specialised international courts and judges’ 
expertise in (areas) of international law  
What type of expertise in international law is required and expected from judges sitting on an 
international court? The simple answer is that the necessary expertise depends on the material 
jurisdiction of a given court. Section 2 argues that material jurisdiction is a determinative but 
not sufficient indicator of the expertise needed on the bench.4 The growing diversification and 
complexity of disputes, observed across all international courts, has an impact on the expertise 
that should be available in the composition of a court.5 Subsection 2.1 discusses whether a 
court of general jurisdiction — the International Court of Justice — needs and has the capacity 
to develop specialised expertise on its bench. Subsection 2.2 addresses the requirement for 
                                               
4 Mackenzie et al., supra note 3, at 51; W. A. Schabas, ‘Introduction’, in W. A. Schabas and S. Murphy (eds.), 
Research Handbook on International Courts and Tribunals (2017), 1, at 13. See also P. Bodeau-Livinec and C. 
Giorgetti, ‘Developing International Law at the Bar’ (2016) 15 The Law & Practice of International Courts and 
Tribunals 177. 
5 On the changing roles, functions and expected conduct of international courts, see B. Kingsbury, ‘International 
Courts: Uneven Judicialisation in Global Order’, in J. Crawford, M. Koskenniemi and S. Ranganathan (eds.), The 
Cambridge Companion to International Law (2012), 203, at 215‒222. 
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specialised international courts to include judges with competence in international law and 
stresses the value of diverse backgrounds within this competence.  
 
2.1 The International Court of Justice and the specialised subject matter of disputes 
The ICJ may hear any dispute concerning international law.6 A notable development is that the 
subject matter of disputes brought before the ICJ is now much more diverse compared to those 
decided in the early and mid-twentieth century. During this period, judges in The Hague were 
mostly presented with cases regarding aspects of the law of treaties. In contrast, the recent 
docket of the ICJ has a different scope, including the use of armed force and international 
humanitarian law, the prohibition of genocide, self-determination, immunities, human rights, 
jurisdiction over international crimes, environmental issues and diplomatic protection, to name 
a few.7 A concurrent trend reinforcing the diversification of cases heard by the ICJ is that 
disputes that can be framed as relating to specialised subject matter (e.g. environmental law or 
human rights) are increasingly seen as relevant candidates for the ICJ’s adjudication. Higgins 
underlines the fact that, although the creation of specialised international courts initially led to 
the decentralisation of cases with a subject matter that the ICJ could, in principle, deal with, 
what is now perceived as specialised subject matter is being brought back into the ICJ’s 
docket.8 
Disputes with specialised subject matter raise the question of whether a court of general 
jurisdiction needs judges who are at least conversant with certain specialised areas of 
international law. It is difficult to discern whether states attach any particular weight to 
competence in specialised fields of international law when nominating and electing judges. 
That being said, one may speculate that, for example, the elections to the bench of Judge 
Higgins (1995–2009), Judge Kooijmans (1997–2006), Judge Buergenthal (2000–2010), Judge 
Simma (2003–2012) and Judge Trindade (2009–present) were not accidental. All these judges 
have a well-established competence in international human rights law and this arguably paved 
the way towards a new approach to human rights issues within the ICJ.9 Judges Simma and 
Higgins explain, when writing extrajudicially, how the background and expertise of certain 
                                               
6 Art. 36 ICJ Statute.  
7 K. J. Keith, ‘International Court of Justice: Reflections on the Electoral Process’ (2010) 9 Chinese JIL 49, at 66‒
67. 
8 R. Higgins, ‘A Babel of Judicial Voices - Ruminations from the Bench’ (2006) 55 ICLQ 791, at 799. 
9 See, e.g., Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo, (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Uganda), 
Judgment, ICJ. Reports 2005, p. 168, at paras, 190, 219‒220; Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v 
Democratic Republic of the Congo) Compensation, Judgment, ICJ Reports 2012, 324, paras. 13, 18, 24, 33, 40, 
56, 66‒68; Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v Senegal) Merits, Judgment, 
ICJ Reports 2012, 422, at paras. 100‒102. 
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judges on the ICJ bench changed the court’s judicial culture.10 Consequently, this testifies to 
the willingness of states to include – either purposefully or as a matter of circumstance – such 
expertise in a court of general jurisdiction. 
In addition to states’ choices when nominating and electing judges, the ICJ has certain 
institutional capacity to consolidate specialised expertise within its corpus. Particularly 
relevant in this regard is Article 26(1) of the ICJ Statute, which envisages the ICJ’s 
specialisation ratione materiae by providing for the formation of chambers to deal with 
particular categories of cases.11 This provision is ‘a tool to develop a special expertise in 
relation to disputes arising in specific fields of international law’.12 Suggestions have been 
made in the past that chambers be formed for disputes concerning labour issues, transit and 
communications, space law, environmental law and the law of the sea.13 The ICJ made use of 
this power for the first time in 1993. In view of developments in the field of environmental law 
and considering that the ICJ ‘should be prepared to the fullest possible extent to deal with any 
environmental case falling within its jurisdiction’,14 the court deemed it appropriate to establish 
a chamber for environmental matters. The members of the chamber were Judges Schwebel, 
Bedjaoui, Evensen, Shahabuddeen, Weeramantry, Ranjeva and Herczegh.15 The initial 
composition of the chamber suggests that the ICJ was attempting to consolidate ‘in-house’ 
expertise on environmental disputes by drawing from the existing judges on the ICJ bench. Of 
the seven members of the chamber, Judge Weeramantry was well conversant with 
environmental matters,16 Judge Ranjeva17 was familiar with such matters in connection to the 
law of the sea and Judge Schwebel could address potential investment-related aspects of 
environmental disputes.18 After no cases had arisen in 13 years, the ICJ did not hold elections 
                                               
10 B. Simma, ‘Mainstreaming Human Rights: The Contribution of the International Court of Justice’ (2012) 3 
Journal International Dispute Settlement 1, at 12‒14; R. Higgins, ‘Human Rights in the International Court of 
Justice’ (2007) 20 LJIL 745, at 746. 
11 The provision reads: ‘The Court may from time to time form one or more chambers, composed of three or more 
judges as the Court may determine, for dealing with particular categories of cases; for example, labour cases and 
cases relating to transit and communications.’ 
12 P. Palchetti, ‘Article 26’, in A. Zimmermann et al. (eds.), The Statute of the International Court of Justice: A 
Commentary (2012), 474, at 490. 
13 E. McWhinney, ‘Special Chambers within the International Court of Justice: The Preliminary: Procedural 
Aspect of the Gulf of Maine Case’ (1985) 12 Syracuse J. Int'l L. & Com. 1, at 4–7. 
14 ICJ Annual Report 1992–1993, at 1, available at www.icj-cij.org/en/annual-reports. 
15 Ibid., at 2. 
16 Judge Weeramantry helped to establish environmental law as an independent branch of international law and 
contributed substantially to issues concerning development. For a list of publications see 
web.archive.org/web/20070727134951/http://www.wicper.org/Judge%27s%20CV.htm. 
17 For his bio see web.archive.org/web/20080412043655/http://www.icj-
cij.org/court/?p1=1&p2=2&p3=1&judge=2. 
18 Judge Schwebel, among other topics, had written extensively on inter-State, investor-State and arbitration; see 
Justice in International Law - Selected Writings of Stephen M. Schwebel (1994), chapters 10-14, 23-28. 
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for a bench for this chamber in 2006.19 It remains an open question whether states considered 
the existing ICJ expertise somehow unsatisfactory and, consequently, whether this was one of 
their reasons for not submitting any disputes to the chamber.20 
To summarise, there may be certain willingness on behalf of States and the ICJ bench 
to enrich the composition of the court with judges with diverse expertise and/or consolidate 
existing specialised expertise. Such efforts would align with the currently diversified and 
specialised subject matter disputes brought before the ICJ. 
 
2.2. Specialised international courts: the role of international law expertise on the bench 
The specialisation of international law led to the emergence of specialised ratione materiae 
courts and, accordingly, to the demand for judges competent in the specialised area of 
international law falling under a court’s jurisdiction. In certain instances, the need for 
specialised expertise is clearly stipulated in the statutory requirements for the nomination and 
election of judges. In others, the statutory requirements for the qualifications of candidates for 
judicial office are rudimentary and do not venture beyond general qualities that judges must 
possess, such as being recognised jurisconsults (in international law).21 One may argue that the 
need for judges with specialised expertise leads to the marginalisation of international law 
expertise22 or compromises between specialised and international law expertise.23 However, at 
the same time, specialised expertise does not necessarily exclude the need for competence in 
international law; in fact it highlights it. This section briefly explains why, even if a court’s 
material jurisdiction is restricted to the interpretation and application of a treaty, other areas of 
international law and, thus, an associated competence, are very relevant to a court’s judicial 
work. The analysis proceeds to unpack the main rationale for including judges with competence 
in international law in a specialised court’s composition. It is argued that we need to see beyond 
                                               
19 Speech by H. E. Judge Rosalyn Higgins, President of the International Court of Justice, to the General Assembly 
of the United Nations, 26 October 2006, available at www.icj-cij.org/files/press-releases/9/13149.pdf; Palchetti, 
supra note 12, at 490. 
20 C. Qiong Wu, ‘A Unified Forum - The New Arbitration Rules for Environmental Disputes under the Permanent 
Court of Arbitration’ (2002) 3 Chinese JIL 263, at 265. 
21 For instance, there is no specific legal expertise requirement for judges to be elected to the European Court of 
Human Rights; see infra note 23. The general formula of ‘jurisconsults of recognized competence in international 
law’, which was established in 1920 with the Statute of the PCIJ and left intact in the ICJ Statute, forms the basis 
of the individual requirements for nominated judges across many international courts and other bodies; see 1920 
Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, 6 LNTS 379, Art. 2. 
22 M. Prost, ‘The Division of Expert Labor in the International Law Discipline: Genealogies of Fragmentation’ 
(2011) 105 ASIL Proc 127, at 128. 
23 G. Ulfstein, ‘The International Judiciary’, in J. Klabbers, A. Peters and G. Ulfstein, The Constitutionalization 
of International Law (2009), 126, at 130. 
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the outdated orthodoxy of the so-called ‘generalist’ international lawyer and elaborate on the 
concrete knowledge and skills required in connection to international law expertise. 
 
2.2.1 Why international law expertise is relevant on the bench of specialised courts 
Judges with competence in international law are needed in the composition of a specialised 
court for at least three reasons. First, competence in international law may be taken as an 
implicit and necessary condition for having acquired recognised competence in a specialised 
area of international law. This is the case with judges sitting on the ITLOS.24 Article 2(1) of 
the Statute of the ITLOS — a tribunal of geographically universal scope endowed with 
specialised jurisdiction on matters of the law of the sea — prescribes that ‘recognised 
competence in the field of the law of the sea’ is the only expertise requirement for members to 
be elected to the tribunal. The absence of a reference to an explicit requirement for recognised 
competence in international law raised certain concerns.25 Yet, in practice, state parties elect 
judges who also have demonstrable recognised competence and practical experience in 
international law.26 A similar example comes from the European Court of Human Rights 
(‘ECtHR’) — a regional and specialised international court. Article 21(1) of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (‘ECHR’) does not provide for any required or desirable 
competence in international law (or in any area in law, for that matter) as a consideration in 
nominating/electing judges.27 Still, in 2010, state parties expressly stressed that knowledge of 
public international law is an implicit requirement under Article 21(1) of the ECHR for 
prospective candidates.28 
A second argument for the relevance of competence in international law on the bench 
of a specialised court is that international law may be part of that court’s applicable law. For 
                                               
24 P. Chandrasekhara Rao, ‘ITLOS: The Conception of the Judicial Function’, in H. P. Hestermeyer et al. (eds.), 
Coexistence, Cooperation and Solidarity: Liber Amicorum Rüdiger Wolfrum (2012), 1725, at 1727–1728. 
Chandrasekhara Rao is a former president (1999–2002) and one of the longest-serving judges of the ITLOS. 
25 I. Brownlie, ‘Problems of Specialisation’, in B. Cheng (ed.), International Law: Teaching and Practice (1982), 
109, at 112; S. Oda, ‘The International Court of Justice from the Bench’ (1993) 244 RCADI 9, at 144–145. Cf. 
H. Caminos, ‘The Growth of Specialised International Tribunals and the Fears of Fragmentation of International 
Law’, in N. Boschiero et al. (eds.), International Courts and the Development of International Law – Essays in 
Honour of Tullio Treves (2013), 55. 
26 M. Wood, ‘The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea and General International Law’ (2007) 22 Int’l J. 
Marine & Coastal L. 351, at 367; A. Yankov, ‘The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea and the 
Comprehensive Dispute Settlement System of the Law of the Sea’, in P. Chandrasekhara Rao and R. Khan (eds.), 
The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (2001), 33, at 43. 
27 According to Art. 21(1) of the ECHR, judges nominated for election to the ECtHR must either possess the 
qualifications required for appointment to high judicial office or be jurisconsults of recognised competence. 1950 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, ETS 5. 
28 High Level Conference on the Future of the European Court of Human Rights, Interlaken Declaration, 19 
February 2010, point 8(a); Guidelines of the Committee of Ministers on the Selection of Candidates for the Post 
of Judge at the European Court of Human Rights, CM(2012)40 Final, 29 Mar 2012, at para. II.4. 
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instance, pursuant to Article 293(1) of the UNCLOS, the ITLOS applies not only the UNCLOS 
but also ‘other rules of international law not incompatible with [the UNCLOS]’.29 The 
International Criminal Court (‘ICC’) may apply ‘where appropriate, applicable treaties and the 
principles and rules of international law, including the established principles of the 
international law of armed conflict’.30 The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights enjoys 
a distinctive contentious jurisdiction extending to the interpretation and application of any 
relevant human rights instrument ratified by the states concerned.31  
Third, many specialised and/or regional courts are regularly seized with questions 
pertaining to international law which need to be addressed in deciding a dispute.32 In this 
regard, the material jurisdiction of international courts arguably falls short of accommodating 
the gradual diversification and complexity of disputes brought before them today. These 
developments have led to the expansion of specialised courts’ domain into so-called ‘general 
international law’33 and other areas of international law. Two characteristic examples are, first, 
the increasing involvement of courts in applying secondary rules of international law, including 
treaty law or the rules on state responsibility, and, second, the need for courts to be capable of 
adequately addressing questions of international law that are incidental to resolving a particular 
dispute. For instance, the ECtHR has to decide issues concerning jurisdiction, state immunity 
and the implementation of UN Security Council resolutions.34 The docket of the Court of 
Justice of the European Union,35 the increased case load and complexity of disputes brought 
                                               
29 See Chandrasekhara Rao, supra note 24, at 1727–1728; T. A. Mensah, ‘The Place of the International Tribunal 
for the Law of the Sea in the International System for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes’, in Chandrasekhara 
Rao and Khan, supra note 26, 21, at 30. 
30 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 2187 UNTS 3, Art. 21(1)(b). 
31 Arts. 3(1) and 7 of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. See A. Rachovitsa, ‘On 
New “Judicial Animals”: The Curious Case of an African Court with Material Jurisdiction of Global Scope’ 
(2019) 19 HRLR 255. 
32 A. Pellet, ‘Should We (Still) Worry about Fragmentation?’, in A. Follesdal and G. Ulfstein (eds.), The 
Judicialization of International Law: A Mixed Blessing? (2018), 228, at 239.  
33 Although most scholars and international courts do not define general international law, there are different 
approaches in conceptualising the term. See International Law Commission, ‘Fragmentation of International Law: 
Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law’, Report of the Study Group of 
the International Law Commission finalised by M. Koskenniemi, UN Doc A/CN.4/ L.682, 13 April 2006, at paras. 
34–37; R. Wolfrum, ‘General International Law (Principles, Rules and Standards)’ Max Planck Encyclopedia of 
Public International Law (last updated December 2010); C. Tomuschat, ‘General International Law: A New 
Source of International Law?’, in R. Pisillo Mazzeschi and P. De Sena (eds.), Global Justice, Human Rights and 
the Modernisation of International Law (2018), 185.  
34 See, e.g., P. Webb, International Judicial Integration and Fragmentation (2013), at 62–102 (discussing 
immunities before the ECtHR); M. Milanovic, Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties: Law, 
Principles, and Policy (2011) (discussing jurisdiction matters before the ECtHR); L.-A. Sicilianos, ‘The European 
Court of Human Rights Facing the Security Council: Towards Systemic Harmonization’ 66 (2017) ICLQ 783 
(discussing UN Security Council Resolutions). 
35 See, e.g., European Commission and Others v Yassin Abdullah Kadi, Joined Cases C-584/10 P, C-593/10 P and 
C-595/10 P, Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber), 18 July 2013; Council of the European Union v Front 
populaire pour la libération de la saguia-el-hamra et du rio de oro (Front Polisario), Case C-104/16 P, Judgment 
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before the panels and the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organisation36 and disputes 
brought before the ITLOS37 point towards the same direction.   
 
2.2.2 Unpacking the knowledge and skills required in connection to international law 
expertise: seeing beyond the outdated orthodoxy of the ‘generalist’ international lawyer  
The diversity and complexity of disputes submitted to specialised international courts has a 
direct impact on the international law expertise required in the composition of the bench.38 
Nonetheless, the discussion on the presence of international lawyers on the bench revolves 
almost exclusively around the idea that their expertise is needed only with respect to general 
international law.39 The first draft of the sixth commission of the Institute of International Law 
suggested that international law expertise is required in order to avoid ‘excessive 
specialisation’.40 Although the term excessive specialisation was not embraced by all members 
of the commission,41 it was generally accepted that ‘[states] shall also ensure that judges 
possess the required competence and that the court or tribunal is in a position effectively to 
deal with issues of general international law’ (emphasis added).42 The singular focus on 
general international law overlooks the fact that the need for the presence of individuals with 
competence in international law on the bench is not limited to their knowledge of general 
international law. Furthermore, the division of judges into experts on general international law 
(‘generalists’) and experts on the specialised treaty/area falling under a court’s material 
jurisdiction (‘specialists’) is counterproductive and reproduces silos between different areas of 
expertise.  
The main rationale for having international lawyers in the composition of a court is that 
ideally they bring ‘onboard’ knowledge of international law and a fundamental skillset that 
                                               
of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 21 December 2016; P. Sands, ‘Introduction and Acknowledgments’, in 
Mackenzie et al., supra note 3, at xii–xiii. 
36 V. Hughes, ‘The Role of the Legal Adviser in the WTO’, in A. Zidar and J. P. Gauci (eds.), The Role of Legal 
Advisers in International Law (2017), 237, at 244. 
37 I. Papanicolopulu, ‘International Judges and the Protection of Human Rights at Sea’, in Boschiero et al., supra 
note 25, 535.  
38 Keith, supra note 7, at 66–67; Sands, supra note 35, at xii–xiii.  
39 Resolution on The Position of the International Judge, supra note 3, at 87–89, 104–105.   
40 Ibid., at 41. 
41 Arsanjani did not share this concern. Treves found the term rather excessive. See Resolution on The Position 
of the International Judge, supra note 3, at 63 and 65, respectively.  
42 Institut de Droit International, Sixth Commission, Resolution on The Position of the International Judge, 9 
September 2011 (Rapporteur: G. Guillaume; Membership: M. Bernhardt, Dame R. Higgins, M. Kirsch, Sir E. 
Lauterpacht, M. M. Makarczyk, M. Rangel, T. Meron, O. Vicuña, R. Ranjeva, G. Ress, S. M. Schwebel, C. 
Tomuschat, T. Treves and L. Wildhaber), Art. 1(1) (emphases added), available at www.idi-
iil.org/en/sessions/rhodes-2011/?post_type=publication. 
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helps avoid or mitigate what is commonly known as ‘tunnel-vision’ or ‘category blindness’.43 
Judges are expected to have a fundamental sensitivity in drawing connections, justified by 
principle and by policy,44 across different rules and areas of international law. The presumption 
is that someone with competence in international law brings the right skills and background to 
avoid ‘tunnel vision’.45 This presumption is not, however, appropriate in all cases. A lawyer 
with recognised competence in international law does not necessarily always have these skills, 
or a good knowledge of the specialised area relevant to the material jurisdiction of a court.46 In 
the present author’s view, and as will be further discussed below, it is highly desirable, if not 
indispensable, that international lawyers have a specialisation in the substantive area(s) of 
international law relevant to the court’s judicial work or, at least, are able to demonstrate a real 
engagement with this area.47 The following points support this argument.  
First, as far as the relationship between general and special international law is 
concerned, the so-called ‘generalists’ ‘attempt to define international law in terms that privilege 
the skills and attributes of […] themselves’.48 D’ Argent describes generalists as  
those who usually conduct research like butterflies going from one flower to 
another: from one topic to another one, interested only in the general structure and 
rules of the international legal order and not in the detailed account of any 
specialised sub-discipline.49 
 
Accounting for the edifice of international law is valuable in itself, but is it always sufficient to 
conceptualise the relationship between general and special areas of law? Judges’ everyday tasks 
are arguably too nuanced and demanding for us to simply accept that public international law 
expertise on the bench automatically resolves tensions between specialised and general law.50 
Higgins brings this nuance to the fore by asking, ‘Are the particular and the general so easy to 
distinguish and slice up?’51 The answer is in the negative: special and general law constantly 
re-inform one another and all international courts inevitably address and develop aspects of 
both ‘general’ and ‘special’ international law. General and special international law cannot be 
                                               
43 Brownlie, supra note 25, at 111. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Pellet, supra note 28, at 240. 
46 S. R. Ratner, ‘International Investment Law through the Lens of Global Justice’ (2017) 20 Journal of 
International Economic Law 747, at 775. 
47 Moreover, the ability to contribute expert knowledge in international law is not a prerogative of the ‘generalist’ 
international lawyer. A specialist in a given area of international law may also have a demonstrable 
background/expertise in (general issues of) international law. 
48 Prost, supra note 22, at 127.  
49 P. D’Argent, ‘Teachers of International Law’, in J. d’Aspremont et al. (eds.), International Law as a Profession 
(2017), 412, at 421. 
50 Cf. Pellet, supra note 28, at 228. 
51 Higgins, supra note 8, at 799. 
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clearly demarcated in the abstract, since their content is by definition relative. Only those well 
versed in both general and special international law can analyse their relationship in view of a 
particular legal question. Furthermore, the presence of a ‘generalist’ and a ‘specialist’ sitting 
next to each other on the bench does not necessarily entail that they can adequately 
communicate and solve the equation of general–special law. We also need trained and 
experienced legal minds capable of bridging the general and the special.  
The second important point is that mitigating ‘tunnel-vision’ and forging connections 
between different rules and areas of international law does not depend solely on the relationship 
between general and special international law. In many cases, the judge needs to construe the 
treaty falling under a specialised court’s jurisdiction within the framework of a given 
(specialised) body of law. Take the example of specialised courts on human rights: judges are 
being increasingly challenged to place regional treaties on human rights in the context of 
international human rights law and to discern how one informs the other.52 Moreover, judges 
have to address questions incidental to the main dispute which pertain to different specialised 
areas of international law.53 This task may include the interpretation of rules and their relevance 
(and even application, subject to the court’s jurisdiction) to a case. For instance, the ITLOS is 
presented with questions on human rights and the ECtHR is faced regularly with matters 
regarding international humanitarian law, the law of armed conflict or the law of the sea.54  
Consequently, there is a specific need for, first, the proven ability to employ 
interpretative tools to identify contextual differences and make connections across different 
areas of international law and, second, a strong background relevant to the material jurisdiction 
of a given court. Klabbers makes a similar point albeit in a different context: when discussing 
inter-legality across national legal systems and the role of judges he underlines ‘the craft, skill, 
and learning to work across legal spaces. It is hypothetically possible that a judge who is very 
good in his or her own jurisdiction might lack the necessary skill or craft to accommodate a 
multitude of legal spaces’.55 Seasoned practitioners and scholars with a uniquely placed grasp 
                                               
52 See, e.g., E. Brems, We Need to Look at International Human Rights Law (Also) as a Whole, EJIL: Talk!, 17 
October 2014, available at www.ejiltalk.org/we-need-to-look-at-international-human-rights-law-also-as-a-whole/ 
(discussion from the point of view of the ECHR). 
53 For a critical and useful discussion of the issue of incidental questions, see L. Marotti, ‘Between Consent and 
Effectiveness: Incidental Determinations and the Expansion of the Jurisdiction of UNCLOS Tribunals’, in 
A. Del Vecchio and R. Virzo (eds.), Interpretations of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea by 
International Courts and Tribunals (2019), 383. 
54 See, e.g., A. van Aaken and I. Motoc (eds.), The European Convention on Human Rights and General 
International Law (2018); A. Caligiuri, ‘Les Liens entre la CEDH et le Droit de la Mer dans la Jurisprudence de 
la Cour Européenne des Droits de l’Homme’, in Del Vecchio and Virzo, supra note 49, 269. 
55 J. Klabbers, ‘Judging Inter-Legality’, in J. Klabbers and G. Palimbella (eds.), The Challenge of Inter-Legality 
(2019), 339, at 357. 
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of, and experience in, law, policy and dispute settlement underscore the importance of a diverse 
representation of specialisations in international law and mixed expertise on the bench.56 In the 
field of arbitration, Crawford stresses that a single ‘species’ of international lawyer offers no 
diversity within the corpus of public international lawyers,57 meaning that the international 
lawyer should offer a combination of backgrounds and expertise. Ratner and Roberts underline 
the need for mixed expertise in the field of investment arbitration.58 Sands and Stephens 
emphasise that for environment-related disputes a body of judges/arbitrators should ideally 
combine general and specialised expertise, since environmental law arguments involve 
different areas of international law (e.g. trade agreements, human rights and environmental 
instruments) and issues of general international law.59 Diverse expertise includes not only 
experts in different areas coming together but also experts with a good knowledge of public 
international law who are particularly well versed in a specialised area of international law. 
Thus, the relevance of a generalist is limited, unless he or she has a specialised background 
too. The significance of a good knowledge of the special should not be underestimated. This 
is reinforced by the example discussed earlier, of judges who are elected to the ITLOS having 
to show competence in both public international law and the law of the sea. A number of judges 
who have served on the ECtHR also stand out for having a ‘dual track record’ in both 
international law and human rights law.60 Interestingly, the Advisory Panel of Experts on 
Candidates for Election as Judge to the ECtHR61 adopts the working presumption that a 
professor of European and/or public international law and constitutional law is to be regarded 
as having competence in the field covered by the jurisdiction of the court, even if he/she has 
not specialised in human rights. Nonetheless, the panel introduces the caveat that professors in 
these and other fields are expected to demonstrate a real engagement during their career with 
questions of human rights related to their own main field of expertise.62 
                                               
56 ‘Presentation by Professor Georges Abi-Saab – Ensuring the Best Bench: Ways of Selecting Judges’, in C. Peck 
and R. S. Lee (eds.), Increasing the Effectiveness of the International Court of Justice: Proceedings of the 
ICJ/UNITAR Colloquium to Celebrate the 50th Anniversary of the Court (1997), 66, at 172–173. 
57 J. Crawford, ‘The Ideal Arbitrator: Does One Size Fit All?’ (2017) 32 Am. U. In t’l L. Rev. 1003, at 1017. 
58 A. Roberts, ‘Incremental, Systemic and Paradigmatic Reform of Investor-State Arbitration’ (2018) 112 AJIL 
at 410; Ratner, supra note 42.  
59 P. Sands, ‘International Environmental Litigation and Its Future’ (1999) 32 U. Rich. L. Rev. 1619, 1638; T 
Stephens, International Courts and Environmental Protection (2009) 58. 
60 See, e.g., Sicilianos who is currently president of the ECtHR; Rozakis (formerly first vice-president); or Ziemele 
(formerly president of the first section). 
61 The Advisory Panel is the independent body created in 2010 to advise the Council of Europe Parliamentary 
Assembly general committee on the suitability of nominated candidates to be elected as judges to the ECtHR; 
Committee of Ministers, Resolution 26/2010, CM/Res(2010)26, 10 November 2010 on the establishment of an 
Advisory Panel of Experts on Candidates for Election as Judge to the European Court of Human Rights. 
62 See Advisory Panel of Experts on Candidates for Election as Judge to the European Court of Human Rights, 
Second Activity Report for the Attention of the Committee of Ministers (2014–2015), Advisory Panel(2016)1, 25 
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By way of concluding this section, the expertise available in the composition of an 
international court can and should be responsive both to the material jurisdiction of that court 
and the growing diversification of the court’s docket. This is possible by ensuring that the 
composition of a court encompasses a diverse international law expertise. Existing statutory 
requirements when nominating and electing judges may accommodate the idea of electing 
judges with mixed and specialised expertise. As far as specialised international courts are 
concerned their bench should incorporate not only judges with specialised expertise relevant 
to a court’s material jurisdiction but also judges with competence in international law, 
including knowledge of general issues of international law and a strong background in the 
specialised area(s). Turning to courts of general jurisdiction, such as the ICJ, a broad 
interpretation of competence in international law would be welcome so as to include also 
judges who are additionally very well versed with certain specialised areas of international law. 
 
3. Designing detailed statutory requirements concerning the presence of expertise in 
international law in the composition of the bench 
The statutory designs of recently established international courts ― including specialised 
courts of a universal scope (e.g. the ICC) and regional specialised courts (e.g. the future African 
Court of Justice and Human Rights and the Caribbean Court of Justice) ― reveal a trend 
towards specifying and quantifying the recognised competence in international law required in 
the composition of the bench. The creation of separate lists for distinct expertise (in 
international law) and the introduction of quantitative requirements for these lists are appealing 
to states. In this way, the overall composition of expertise on the bench may be shaped without 
having to impose such expertise requirements on all judges.63 However, caution is advised with 
very detailed schemes that specifically quantify the number of judges who must demonstrate 
competence in international law. Such schemes run the risk of being inflexible and becoming 
redundant in the future. Moreover, it is not clear whether the number of judges on the bench 
who must have competence in international law is appropriate or excessive ― unless it is 




                                               
February 2016, para. 45, available at www.coe.int/en/web/dlapil/advisory-panel. The approach of the ICC 
Advisory Committee seems to be very similar; see infra section 3.1.  
63 Mackenzie et al., supra note 3, at 46–47.  
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3.1 The International Criminal Court 
For the purposes of electing judges to the ICC, state parties place a high value on the expertise 
requirement of established competence in international law. The Rome Statute of the ICC 
(‘ICC Statute’) introduces a specific track for candidates with competence in international law 
and sets out a concrete, mandatory quantitative scheme. More specifically, the ICC Statute 
creates two lists of candidates. List A contains candidates with established competence in 
criminal law and procedure and the necessary relevant experience, whether as a judge, 
prosecutor, advocate or in another, similar capacity, in criminal proceedings.64 List B includes 
candidates with established competence in relevant areas of international law, such as 
international humanitarian law and the law of human rights, and extensive experience in a 
professional legal capacity of relevance to the judicial work of the ICC.65 At the first election 
to the ICC, it was stipulated that at least nine judges must be elected from list A and at least 
five from list B. Subsequent elections were organised in such a way as to maintain these 
proportions.66 The importance that ICC state parties place on the presence of international law 
expertise on the ICC bench is further illustrated by comparing it to the statutes of the 
International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and for Rwanda (ICTR), 
according to which established experience in international law is only one factor to consider 
when deciding the composition of chambers and sections of trial chambers.67 
The fairly detailed expertise arrangements in the ICC Statute can be explained by the 
challenges of ensuring a fair trial and the politicisation of the election of ICC judges.68 The two 
separate lists of candidates served the aim of striking a balance between the need for judges 
with criminal law experience for the pretrial and trial divisions of the ICC, on the one hand, 
and the need for international law experience in the appeals division, on the other.69 The 
presence of international law expertise was deemed necessary for various reasons. When the 
ICC began functioning, judges with organisational and diplomatic skills (e.g. concluding 
bilateral agreements) were required; individuals with competence and experience in 
                                               
64 Art. 36(3)(b)(i) and (5) ICC Statute. 
65 Art. 36(3)(b)(ii) and (5) ICC Statute. 
66 Art. 36(5) ICC Statute. 
67 ‘In the overall composition of the Chambers and sections of the Trial Chambers, due account shall be taken of 
the experience of the judges in criminal law, international law, including international humanitarian law and 
human rights law’; see Art. 13 Statute ICTY; Art. 12 Statute ICTR. 
68 Wood, supra note 26, at 362–363. 
69 M. Bohlander, 'Article 36: Qualifications, Nomination and Election of Judges', in O. Triffterer and K. Ambos 
(eds.), Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary (2016), 1216, at 1220; Mackenzie et al., 
supra note 3, at 46–47.  
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international law very often have such skills and experience.70 It was also expected that certain 
cases would require a solid knowledge of general issues of international law (e.g. state 
responsibility and treaty law).  
However, the requirement for international law expertise is contentious and it is not 
clear whether these reasons justify a separate list of candidates and the fixed number of five 
judges from list B on the ICC bench.71 Schabas casts doubt on the necessity of this statutory 
requirement, stating that it was exaggerated in the drafting stage given the influence of Antonio 
Cassese and that international law expertise is called for only infrequently.72 Recently, Jacobs, 
Ambos and a report by Open Society Justice Initiative submit that knowledge of international 
law should become a subsidiary criterion for the selection of judges to the ICC ― with no need 
for a separate candidate track73 (or only for a separately elected Appeals Chamber, according 
to Guilfoyle).74 In light of the ICC’s increasing judicial and trial activity, experts exposed to 
its inner workings suggest that increasing the number of judges with criminal law experience 
and a good familiarity with international criminal law should be prioritised instead.75 
Curiously, we might say that international criminal law expertise has been neglected in favour 
of public international law expertise.  
It also appears that, in practice, the requirement for international law expertise is 
(ab)used as a pretext by states and judges alike. State parties present candidates who have no 
practical judicial experience but are former diplomats and, therefore, close to the executive 
power.76 In other instances, like the public spat over who would preside over the Gbagbo 
appeal, the issue of judges’ competence in international law seems to have been used as a 
pretext serving judges’ internal politics rather than being a genuine concern.77 Ironically 
                                               
70 Kai Ambos, ‘Interests of Justice? The ICC Urgently needs reforms’, EJIL:Talk!, 11 June 2019, available at 
www.ejiltalk.org/interests-of-justice-the-icc-urgently-needs-reforms/. 
71 MacKenzie et al., supra note 3, at 46–47. 
72 W. A. Schabas, The International Criminal Court – A Commentary on the Rome Statute (2016), at 531–532.  
73 Ambos, supra note 70; D. Jacobs, ‘Some Reactions to Douglas Guilfoyle’s Posts on the Troubles of the ICC’, 
EJIL:Talk!, 1 April 2019, available at www.ejiltalk.org/some-reactions-to-douglas-guilfoyles-posts-on-the-
troubles-of-the-icc/; Open Society Justice Initiative, Report, Raising the Bar: Improving the Nomination and 
Election of Judges to the International Criminal Court, 2019, at 9. 
74 D. Guifoyle, ‘Of Babies, Bathwater, and List B Judges at the International Criminal Court’, EJILTalk!, 13 
November 2019, available at www.ejiltalk.org/of-babies-bathwater-and-list-b-judges-at-the-international-
criminal-court/. 
75 Ambos, supra note 70; Jacobs, supra note 73. 
76 Ambos, supra note 70.  
77 The President of the Appeals Division appointed the judge and president of the ICC Chile Eboe-Osuji as the 
presiding judge in the Gbagbo appeal case, even though Eboe-Osuji was already the presiding judge in Jordan’s 
appeal concerning its failure to arrest Omar al-Bashir. Judge Luz del Carmen Ibañez Carranza, who is yet to be 
assigned to an appeal as a presiding judge, dissented from the decision to assign Judge Eboe-Osuji as a presiding 
judge to the case. Judge Luz del Carmen Ibañez Carranza underlined that the decision about who should preside 
the Gbagbo appeal case was adopted not on the basis of rotation or seniority but ‘on the basis of the alleged 
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enough, when public international law competence was indeed required in Jordan Referral re 
Al-Bashir,78 none of the judges sitting on the appeals chamber were drawn from list B 
candidates with recognised competence in international law.79 In addition to this, it appears 
that, when questions of international law arise, judges from list A do not generally consult List 
B colleagues.80 
Yet, the meaning of international law expertise needs to be further clarified with 
reference to the ICC Statute and the insights of the ICC Advisory Committee on Nominations 
of ICC Judges.81 The singular focus on general issues of international law, as mentioned earlier, 
and the potential for abuse of the expertise requirements, are not helpful in understanding the 
expertise needs of the ICC bench. The ICC Statute is strongly oriented towards expertise in 
specialised areas of international law which are informative to the bench.82 Article 36 of the 
ICC Statute is geared towards the fields of human rights and international humanitarian law.83 
The emphasis on specialised expertise is also evident when the ICC Statute requires state 
parties to ‘take into account the need to include judges with legal expertise on specific issues, 
including, but not limited to, violence against women or children’.84 
The assessments of the ICC Advisory Committee from 2012 to 2017 furnish insights 
into how the requirement of ‘established competence in relevant areas of international law such 
                                               
expertise of one of the judges on “no case to answer” matters’. See Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire in 
the Case of the Prosecutor v Laurent Gbagbo and Charles Blé Goudé (Appeals Chamber), Decision on the 
Presiding Judge of the Appeals Chamber in the appeal of the Prosecutor against the oral decision of Trial Chamber 
I taken pursuant to article 81(3)(c)(i) of the Statute, ICC-02/11-01/15 OA14, 18 January 2019, available at 
www.legal-tools.org/doc/a97417/pdf/; ibid., Dissenting Opinion of Judge Luz del Carmen Ibañez Carranza, para. 
6, available at www.legal-tools.org/doc/558552/pdf/. See K. J. Heller, ‘The ICC and Appeals Division Presidents 
Defend the Presiding Judge Decision’, Opinion Juris, 22 January 2019, available at 
opiniojuris.org/2019/01/22/the-icc-and-appeals-division-presidents-defend-the-presiding-judge-decision/. 
78 Appeals Chamber, Judgment in the Jordan Referral re Al-Bashir Appeal, ICC-02/05-01/09-397-Corr, 6 May 
2019, available at www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/record.aspx?docNo=ICC-02/05-01/09-397. 
79 Presiding Judge Chile Eboe-Osuji and Judges Solomy Balungi Bossa and Howard Morrison seem to have 




80 Raising the Bar: Improving the Nomination and Election of Judges to the International Criminal Court, supra 
note 73, at 21-22. 
81 In 2012, the Assembly of state parties created the Advisory Committee on Nominations of ICC Judges. The 
Committee’s role is advisory. See International Criminal Court - Assembly of States Parties, Report of the Bureau 
Working Group on the Advisory Committee on Nominations, ICC-ASP/11/47, 8 November 2012. All reports of 
the Advisory Committee are available at asp.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/asp/ACN/Pages/default.aspx. For a critical 
assessment of the work of the ICC Advisory Committee see Raising the Bar: Improving the Nomination and 
Election of Judges to the International Criminal Court, supra note 73, at 43-47.  
82 Schabas, supra note 72.  
83 International humanitarian law and human rights law were also among the examples mentioned in the ICTY 
and ICTR Statutes when referring to the need for judges to have experience in international law. See Art. 13 
Statute ICTY; Art. 12 Statute ICTR. 
84 Art. 36(8)(b) ICC Statute. 
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as international humanitarian law and the law of human rights’ is construed by nominating 
states and the ICC Advisory Committee itself. Public international law expertise is significant, 
but it is considered sufficient as long as it is complemented with a specialisation in an area of 
international law and extensive professional legal experience of relevance to the judicial work 
of the ICC. The expertise of nominees relates to international law, in general, but the defining 
criteria for nomination/election seem to be expertise and experience in international human 
rights law, coupled with considerable knowledge in international criminal law and international 
humanitarian law.85 For instance, significant research experience in human rights relating to 
the criminal justice system, fair trial rights and rights of the defence is also a weighty 
consideration.86 With regard to ‘extensive experience in a professional legal capacity which is 
of relevance to the judicial work of the Court’, state parties and the advisory committee prefer 
candidates who have the following types of experience: litigating experience in human rights 
law or international criminal law;87 field experience in human rights;88 having served as a legal 
officer at international courts89 or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs;90 experience presiding expert 
committees or implementing human rights and criminal law standards at the national level;91 
and having engaged in relevant policymaking and lawmaking activities.92 The previous points 
strongly suggest that the relevant areas of international law anchor the meaning of international 
law expertise. Therefore, candidates with diverse and mixed competence and experience in 
international law and other specialised areas thereof should be prioritised. Arguably the weight 
attached to the competence in or engagement with (international) criminal law should be 
strengthened when nominating and/or electing judges from list B. Consequently, what appears 
                                               
85 International Criminal Court - Assembly of States Parties, Report of the Advisory Committee on Nominations 
of Judges on the work of its third meeting, ICC-ASP/13/22, 29 September 2014, at 10–12; International Criminal 
Court - Assembly of States Parties, Report of the Advisory Committee on Nominations of Judges on the work of 
its sixth meeting, ICC-ASP/16/7, 10 October 2017, at 11, 12. 
86 2014 ICC Advisory Committee, supra note 78, at 11. 
87 2017 ICC Advisory Committee, supra note 78, at 12 (litigating complex criminal cases before the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights as counsel, focusing inter alia on the rights of women, children, 
prisoners and enforced disappearances); 2014 ICC Advisory Committee, supra note 78, at 11 (having been listed 
as counsel qualified for appointment to represent accused and victims before the ICC); 2014 ICC Advisory 
Committee, supra note 78, at 11 (having gained experience in working on victims’ rights in the criminal process). 
88 2017 ICC Advisory Committee, supra note 78, at 11.  
89 For instance, having worked as a legal officer at the ICJ or the ICTR; see 2014 ICC Advisory Committee, supra 
note 78, at 10 and 11–12, respectively. 
90 Ibid., at 12 (working as the director of Legal Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs); ibid., at 11 (working 
in relevant areas in said Ministry).  
91 Ibid., at 11 (presiding and providing several legal opinions on human rights and criminal matters at the national 
level); ibid., at 12 (presiding the National Institution of Human Rights and Ombudsman). 
92 Ibid., at 11–12 (e.g. participating in the negotiations leading up to the Rome Statute, serving as the ambassador 
to the UN or heading a national delegation at the UN Human Rights Commission). 
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to be problematic is not necessarily the statutory requirement per se but rather the way that 
states construe it in practice. 
 
3.2 The African Court of Justice and Human Rights  
The African Court of Justice and Human Rights is expected to merge the Court of Justice of 
the African Union and the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACtHPR) into a 
single court.93 The Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights differs from the 
Statute of the ACtHPR concerning the qualifications for prospective judges. According to the 
Statute of the ACtHPR, nominated judges can be individuals of recognised practical, judicial 
or academic competence and experience in the field of human and peoples’ rights.94 In contrast, 
the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights follows the ICC Statute by 
creating two separate lists of candidates: list A concerns candidates who have recognised 
competence and experience in international law and list B relates to candidates who possess 
recognised competence and experience in human rights law.95 At the first election, eight judges 
will be elected from list A and eight from list B; the same proportion of judges elected from 
the two lists should be maintained in subsequent elections.96  
These new individual requirements for electing judges to the future African Court of 
Justice and Human Rights can be explained by the court’s broad jurisdiction, which extends to 
disputes concerning, among others, any question of international law.97 This wide jurisdiction 
ratione materiae explains why the drafters specifically provided for the requirement for 
international law expertise in addition to competence in human rights. Nonetheless, it is unclear 
whether the specified quota of judges with competence in international law (half of the judges 
on the bench) is excessive. It remains to be seen whether the processes of nomination and 
election will construe competence in international law as also including specialised areas of 
                                               
93 Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, adopted by the eleventh ordinary 
session of the African Union Assembly, 1 July 2008 (not in force), available at  
au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/7792-treaty-0035_-
_protocol_on_the_statute_of_the_african_court_of_justice_and_human_rights_e.pdf. As of 6 February 2019, 
seven instruments of ratification have been deposited. The Protocol and the Statute annexed to it will enter into 
force 30 days after the deposit of the instruments of ratification by 15 member states. 
94 Art. 11(1) Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People's Rights on the Establishment of an African 
Court on Human and People's Rights. 
95 Art. 4 Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights (Qualifications of Judges) 
reads: ‘The Court shall be composed of impartial and independent Judges elected from among persons of high 
moral character, who possess the qualifications required in their respective countries for appointment to the 
highest judicial offices, or are juris-consults of recognised competence and experience in international law, 
international human rights law, international humanitarian law or international criminal law.’ 
96 Ibid., Art. 6. 
97 Ibid., Art. 28. 
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international law which can be of relevance to the court’s work (e.g. international criminal 
law). 
 
3.3 The Caribbean Court of Justice 
Finally, the Statute of the Caribbean Court of Justice also presents certain interesting features 
compared to other international courts.98 Elected judges need to have served as judges for at 
least five years and distinguished themselves in that office or to have taught law for a period 
of at least 15 years and distinguished themselves in the legal profession.99 The CCJ is composed 
of the president and not more than nine other judges, of whom at least three (including the 
president) need to possess expertise in international law, including international trade law.100 
Presently, the CCJ comprises seven judges (including the president),101 two with expertise in 
international human rights law (Judge Winston Anderson and Justice Denys Barrow)102 and 
one with expertise in international trade law (Judge Andrew Burgess).103  
To sum up, states are keen on adopting detailed statutory requirements in order to 
specify and quantify the presence of judges with recognised competence in international law 
and relevant areas thereof on the bench. Such areas include international law, international 
humanitarian law and human rights law (ICC); international trade law and human rights law 
(CCJ); or international law and human rights law (future African Court of Justice and Human 
Rights). The specificities of each international court require context-specific discussion. In the 
case of the ICC the international law expertise in the composition of the court is currently 
highly debatable and gives rise to underling politics. The statutory requirement does not seem 
to be problematic per se; it is the way that it is being applied by states when nominating and 
electing judges. It is premature to draw any conclusions with regard to the statutes of the CCJ 
and the future African Court of Justice and Human Rights. Given the ongoing experimentation 
in state practice envisaging the presence of different types of expertise in the composition of a 
court is welcome but caution is advised with setting up overly detailed schemes.  
                                               
98 The Caribbean Court of Justice is both the highest municipal court in the region and an international court with 
compulsory and exclusive jurisdiction in respect of the interpretation and application of the Treaty of 
Chaguaramas. See K. Malleson, ‘Promoting Judicial Independence in the International Courts: Lessons from the 
Caribbean’ (2009) 58 ICLQ 671, at 674.  
99 2011 Agreement Establishing the Caribbean Court of Justice, available at www.ccj.org/court-instruments/the-
agreement-establishing-the-ccj/, Art. 4(10)(a) and (b). 
100 Art. 4(1) Agreement Establishing the Caribbean Court of Justice. 
101 See www.ccj.org/about-the-ccj/judges. 
102 Their bios are available at www.caribbeancourtofjustice.org/about-the-ccj/judges/anderson and 
www.caribbeancourtofjustice.org/about-the-ccj/judges/the-honourable-mr-justice-denys-barrow respectively. 
103 His bio is available at www.ccj.org/about-the-ccj/judges/the-honourable-mr-justice-andrew-burgess. 
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4 Conclusion  
Deciding who will sit on the court as a judge is one of the ways that states control international 
courts.104 Therefore, the composition of an international court is shaped by the role states 
expect it to play in international affairs.105 The jurisdiction of existing international courts may 
not alter, but courts engage with changing functions, which can be seen in the current density 
of international law and the complex and diversified disputes brought by states and other actors 
to be judicially adjudicated. 
It is difficult to ascertain whether states attach any particular weight to expertise 
requirements and, in particular, to competence in (specialised fields of) international law, when 
nominating and electing judges. This chapter, however, has shown that there is certain evidence 
to support the view that states do attach significance to these requirements. This may be 
inferred from the choices made by states when, for instance, they systematically elect 
individuals with a strong background in international human rights law to the ICJ bench, or 
from express statements to the effect that competence in international law is implicit in the 
statutory requirements for judges sitting on the ITLOS and the ECtHR respectively or practice 
that points to this assumption.  
The chapter argued that, subject to the specifics of each court, the meaning of the 
statutory requirement competence in international law should be read in a broad fashion, 
seeking out individuals who not only have recognised competence in international law stricto 
sensu but also strong complementary knowledge in specialised area(s) of international law 
relevant to a given court’s judicial work. Judges who are conversant with both general and 
special aspects and areas of international law are well placed to navigate the complexity and 
density of international law entrenched in disputes submitted for international adjudication. 
The detailed expertise requirements included in the statutes of new international courts strongly 
suggest a turn towards favouring and quantifying different types of expertise in international 
law on the bench. In practice, state parties motivated by various considerations may apply these 
requirements in order to favour particular kinds of expertise, as was discussed in the case of 
the ICC. It remains to be seen whether the detailed quotas for the number of judges will be 
flexible enough to accommodate different priorities and the real needs of the bench. 
 
                                               
104 Sands, supra note 1, at 485. 
105 Kingsbury, supra note 5, at 215–222; Keith, supra note 7, at 66–67. 
